. ‘Mrs. Walker 's Merry games for little people’: Locating Froebel in an alien environment. British Journal of Educational Studies: Vol. 38, No. 1, pp. 15-32.

Attempts to formalize the diagnostic process are by no means a recent undertaking; what is new is the availability of an engine to process these formalizations. The digital computer has therefore been increasingly turned to in the expectation of developing systems which will assist or replace the physician in diagnosis. Such efforts involve a number of assumptions regarding the nature of the diagnostic process: e.g. where it begins, and where it ends. ‘Diagnosis’ appears to include a number of quite different (...) cognitive processes, some of which seem more subject to formalization than others. Underlying the difficulties inherent in these efforts at formalization, is the hierarchical structure of medical knowledge including that of diseases. (By ‘hierarchical structure’, I mean no more than that our descriptions of clinical objects necessarily refer to different levels of organization; atomic, molecular, cellular, physiological system, entire patient.) Since diagnosis is in part a form of classification, measures of similarity between the clinical findings of a particular patient and a potential disease, are needed. This is complicated by the fact that some diseases are described using the vocabularies of physics and chemistry, others with the vocabulary of psychology, and most, with terms taken from a number of different hierarchical levels. The differences between the descriptions made using these vocabularies will be seen to exert systematic (if not uniform) influences upon the diagnostic process. CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:American Journal of Philology 122.3 (2001) 447-451 [Access article in PDF] Elizabeth Baynham. Alexander the Great: The Unique History of Quintus Curtius. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1998. xiv + 237 pp. Cloth, $39.50. This is a well-organized book that is abreast of recent scholarship and contributes to our understanding of Q. Curtius Rufus and his History of Alexander as a work of literature. Baynham tells us (...) that her primary objective is an analysis of Curtius' historical methods and arrangements of his material and an evaluation of his chief themes. Her introductory chapter sketches the influence of Curtius' History in the Middle Ages and Renaissance and gives a brief synopsis of scholarship in the field. A chapter entitled "Roman Curtius" attempts to place the author and his work into the broader framework of Roman literature, with a particular focus on his language and themes and the influences that shaped these. A lengthy chapter on sources and historical methods reviews Curtius' place within the tradition of ancient historians of Alexander the Great. The three most original chapters explore the motifs of fortuna and regnum in Curtius' portrait of [End Page 447] Alexander. The book concludes with an appendix surveying the debate over the date of Curtius' History of Alexander. Baynham considers at length the current "consensus" view that the work was written under Claudius but ultimately decides that a date under Vespasian is "most likely." The index, unfortunately, is too brief to be very helpful: following up on Baynham's discussion of the idea of regnum in Curtius, the reader must look up eighteen undifferentiated references to libertas. The absence of an index of passages discussed is a serious omission, which detracts significantly from the book's usefulness.Despite Baynham's assertion of the "apathy" and "hostility" of twentieth-century Curtian study (5), Curtius Rufus (as she points out elsewhere) has not lacked for attention in recent decades. J. E. Atkinson's A Commentary on Q. Curtius Rufus' Historiae Alexandri Magni (Amsterdam 1980, 1994) is supplemented by his survey of scholarship on Curtius (ANRW 2.34.4 [1997]: 3447-83). For those without Latin, there is a Penguin translation by John Yardley. At the other end of the scale, there is Jean Therasse, Quintus Curtius Rufus Index Verborum (1976). Some of this work is admittedly excessive and unproductive. The Loeb edition by J. C. Rolfe (1946), for example, is still available and offers a better translation than Yardley. More significantly, it is not clear how much is gained by lengthy commentaries on passages of Curtius, particularly in the face of A. B. Bosworth's Historical Commentary on Arrian's History of Alexander (1980, 1995) and P. A. Brunt's Loeb edition of Arrian (1976, 1983), which offers such extensive notes that it might well be called a commentary. Of necessity, historical commentators on Arrian and Curtius traverse much of the same ground. Moreover, all this attention to Curtius as a historian has not--perhaps cannot--reverse the commonsense judgment that Arrian is the better and more reliable source.In a sense, the attention of historians has diminished our understanding of Curtius' History of Alexander. Rather than approaching the work as a whole, they ransack Curtius for isolated statements and anecdotes to bolster their own view of particular incidents in Alexander's career. This is poor methodology and poor history. It would be a signal achievement of Baynham's book if it could direct more attention to Curtius by literary scholars. It is in this area that interesting work on Curtius has been done in the last two decades: for example, Werner Rutz's "Zur Erzahlungskunst des Q. Curtius Rufus," ANRW 32.4 (1986): 2329-57, Francesca Minissale's Curzio Rufo: Un romaziere della storia (1983), and H. Currie's "Quintus Curtius Rufus: The Historian as Novelist?" Groningen Colloquia on the Novel 3 (1990): 63-77.Curtius' History of Alexander is a text that might lend itself well to the approaches of genre study and narrative technique. It is disappointing that Baynham does not do more in this direction... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:[Quaestio prima: quomodo est anima omnia]“Anima quodammodo est omnia.”2Verbum Philosophi est et abbreviatum; non autem omnibus satis manifestum. Quid me, Vir Dei,3 iam sollicitas in isto? Scis enim quod imperitussum scientia, et iste sermo profunda forte indiget exquisitione. Quaeris ergo specificari tibi illud quod dico ‘quodammodo’; quomodo enim erit anima omnia? Istum modum velles tibi specificari: autin summa dictione una, aut secundum singula entia singulos modos explicare.Videtur ergo ipse (...) Philosophus declarare istam propositionem inductive sic:‘sensus est quodammodo sensibilia, intellectus est quodammodo intelligibilia’,4igitur etc.[Obiectiones]Hic statim duo obicis:Primum quod cum anima tres partes habeat – vegetativam, sensitivam,intellectivam – in hac ostensione Philosophi ipsum vegetativum nulli entium attribuitur per quodammodo essendi idem, ergo videtur quod non debeatdicere: anima simpliciter quodammodo est omnia, sed secundum aliquas parteseius solum.Item, videtur quod debeat dici quod solum intellectivum sit quodammmodo omnia; nam omnia omnino sunt intelligibilia: universalia, singularia. Omnes naturae vere et simpliciter intelligibiles sunt quantum in ipsis est, licet prima et remotissima principia a nobis non intelligantur. Defectus enim in nobis est sicut in oculis vespertilionis, quibus non videt solem.[2] Item, quomodo est sensus ipsa sensibilia et intellectus ipsa intelligibilia?Aeque enim ignotae sunt hae assumptiones sicut et conclusio. Nam sensitivum res vivens est et substantia; sensibilia, res non-viventes et accidentia, qualitates de tertia specie qualitatis.5 Quomodo ergo est haec illa? Iam enim patet quod non conveniunt nisi in esse et ente tantum; in nullo enim genereomnino. Igitur videtur quod nihil sit dictu ‘sensus est quodammodo sensibilia’.Nam multo magis proprie et vere dictum videretur si diceret quis ‘homoquodammodo est asinus’, nam haec conveniunt in genere et generibus.Similiter, quaeris ex parte intellectus et intelligibilium. Intelligibilia enimsunt et substantiae et accidentia, et res viventes et non-viventes; ipsum autem intellectivum, solum substantia et res vivens.[Prima responsio Philosophi ad obiectionem secundam: Sensus est in potentia tale quale sensibile in actu]6Vir Dei, dices mihi, colligendo ex ipso eodem auctore, et respondebis |A 281vb| mihi cum quaero: sensus quomodo est ipsum sensibile? Respondebis cum Philosopho, quia hoc modo, scilicet quod ‘sensus est in potentia tale quale est ipsum sensibile in actu’,7 et illud pertractabis ad singulos sensus et sensibilia. Sic visus est in potentia tale quale est ipsum visibile in actu, et ita de aliis.Sed ego contra: Vir Dei, si ‘sensus est in potentia tale etc.’, ergo aliquando erit in actu tale, etc.Ad idem: sentire quoddam pati est et quaedam alteratio. Est enim sensus de genere virtutum passivarum secundum eundem Philosophum.8 Agens autem et patiens in principio sunt dissimilia; in fine vero, cum passum est, sunt similia.Igitur sensitivum ex quo sentiendo quodammodo patitur et passivum est. Infine cum passum est, simile erit ipsi activo, scilicet sensibili. Tunc igitur erit‘sensus tale in actu quale est etiam ipsum sensibile in actu’.Sed nunc quaero quid hoc sit dictu, scilicet quod aliquando ipsum sensitivum in actu sit tale quale ipsum sensibile. Quid dicis ‘tale quale’? Numquid si actu video colorem, est virtus visiva oculi mei actu color? Aut non dicis talis estcolor? Quaero, si in qualitate assimilabitur illa virtus visiva actu colori, nihil videtur huiusmodi expositio. |E 107vb| Sicut enim superius dictum est, non videntur convenire nisi in solo ente et esse.9Confiteor, Vir Dei, quia haec ultimo obiecta tentativa sunt, sed necessaria tamen ad propositum si recte dissolvantur, per gratiam ergo Dei et per orationes tuas, Vir Dei, spero ad haec quandoque redire.[Secunda responsio Philosophi ad obiectionem secundam: homo ut mundus minor]Sed nec illud quod legimus videtur sufficere ad propositum problema, Vir Dei: ‘homo est quodammodo omnis creatura et mundus’, minor scilicet,10 et communicans cum omnibus creaturis, hoc modo: “esse cum lapidibus, vivere cum plantis, sentire cum brutis, intelligere cum angelis,” et tandem cum Deo.11Si secundum hunc modum velim praedictum sermonem exponere, non erit.. (shrink)

Publishing a collection of fragments from a classical author is a risky business: the moment the book appears in print, it may already be outdated, as new fragments could have come to light. Or, in the words of Ecclesiasticus 18:7: ‘When a man hath done, then he beginneth; and when he leaveth off, then he shall be doubtful’. The same fate befell me shortly after the publication of my collection of fragments from Rufus of Ephesus' On Melancholy. Manfred Ullmann (...) wrote to me that the late Rainer Degen had discovered a new fragment; in the course of my research, I came across some relevant quotations in the Hippocratic Treatments by the tenth-century author aṭ-Ṭabarī; and recently, Klaus-Dietrich Fischer published two related fragments. The following short note contains these new fragments together with an English translation and commentary. At the end, I also offer some addenda and corrigenda, partly in light of the reviews that have since appeared. (shrink)

Rufus of Ephesus (fl.c.a.d.100) wrote a large body of works on a variety of medical topics. Generally speaking, the Arabic tradition is particularly important for the reconstruction of much of his œuvre. In the present article, I am going to present four new fragments of Rufus’On Melancholyand a fragment from an otherwise unknown monographOn Preferring Fresh Poppies. These new fragments provide fascinating new insights into Rufus’ approach to recording case histories.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Jonathan Edwards's Philosophy of History: The Reenchantment of the World in the Age of EnlightenmentJohn E. SmithAvihu Zakai. Jonathan Edwards's Philosophy of History: The Reenchantment of the World in the Age of Enlightenment. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003. Pp. xvii + 348. Cloth, $49.95.Edwards's History of Redemption is the focus of this study by Avihu Zakai—Professor of History at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem. The History is a (...) series of thirty sermons Edwards preached on Isaiah 51:8 "... my righteousness shall be forever... my salvation from generation to generation." For him, it was a "new method in divinity... thrown into the form of a history"—a narrative showing God's sovereignty in redemption "from the fall of man to the end of the world."Zakai gives a comprehensive account of Edwards's view of history meant to highlight his struggle against modern beliefs threatening Christian faith (308; passim). The discussion is not limited to history, but includes most of Edwards's writing from 1720-1750 with emphasis on his opposition to the Enlightenment. Zakai cannot interpret so many works with the accuracy needed; he repeats old errors such as opposing the "head" and "heart" in the Affections and minimizing Edwards's respect for "common morality" in the ethical writings. Zakai is right in saying that Edwards insisted on God's authority over the world and history, but he puts it in such absolutistic terms that he often seems to abandon historical analysis in favor of exhortation.Zakai's best contribution is in his search for the general framework of God's redemption of the "engine" driving history (120ff.; 213ff.). He finds the answer in "seasons" of revival such as the Great Awakening. This is true, but Edwards notes other special events like the Reformation that "promoted the work of redemption" (Works, 9. 272), but are not revivals in the usual sense. For Edwards, special events are of many kinds and are identified by interpretation based on God's Providence. As Miller claimed, interpretation is essential; without it we may have a chronicle of events, but no history. Zakai seems to underestimate this point and the many problems it poses.The book strikes me as one more attempt—George Marsden's recent book, Jonathan Edwards: A Life (New Haven, 2003), is another—to rescue Edwards from "profane" interpreters like Miller who saw that Edwards learned from the Enlightenment even though he challenged many of its ideas. In my view, Edwards can well take care of himself.John E. SmithYale UniversityCopyright © 2004 Journal of the History of Philosophy, Inc.... (shrink)

_Perennial wisdom from one of history’s most important but lesser-known Stoic teachers__ “He knew that all a philosopher could do was respond well—bravely, boldly, patiently—to what life threw at us. That's what we should be doing now.”—Ryan Holiday, Reading List email_ The Stoic philosopher Musonius Rufus was one of the most influential teachers of his era, imperial Rome, and his message still resonates with startling clarity today. Alongside Stoics like Seneca, Epictetus, and Marcus Aurelius, he emphasized ethics in action, (...) displayed in all aspects of life. Merely learning philosophical doctrine and listening to lectures, they believed, will not do one any good unless one manages to interiorize the teachings and apply them to daily life. In Musonius Rufus’s words, “Philosophy is nothing else than to search out by reason what is right and proper and by deeds to put it into practice.” At a time of renewed interest in Stoicism, this collection of Musonius Rufus’s lectures and sayings, beautifully translated by Cora E. Lutz with an introduction by Gretchen Reydams-Schils, offers readers access to the thought of one of history’s most influential and remarkable Stoic thinkers. (shrink)

One day towards the end of the eighth century the scribe of cod. Paris. Lat. 7530, a miscellany to which we owe the carmen de figuris , began to copy out for us, on the 28th leaf of the MS, the Thyestes of Varius. He transcribed the title and the prefatory note, which run thus: INCIPIT THVESTA VARII. Lucius Varius cognomento Rufus Thyesten tragoediam magna cura absolutam post Actiacam uictoriam Augusti ludis eius in scaena edidit, pro qua fabula sestertium (...) deciens accepit. Then he changed his mind: he proceeded with a list of the notae employed by Probus and Aristarchus, and the masterpiece of Roman tragedy has rejoined its author in the shades. (shrink)

Rufus of Ephesus (fl. c.100c.e.) was a prolific medical author and practitioner in the Imperial period whose historical importance has been obscured by the loss of most of his works. One of the largest gaps in our knowledge of Rufus’ corpus is his gynaecological writings, none of which survives in full. This article assembles and comments on several fragments from Rufus’ lost gynaecological workOn the Retention of Menses(perhapsΠερὶ τῶν ἐπεχομένων ἐμμήνων). Comparison of overlapping passages from the authors (...) Ibn al-Jazzār (tenth century) and Aëtius of Amida (sixth century) reveals that more fragments of this work in Arabic and Greek have survived than previously thought. These fragments provide new evidence for the analysis of Rufus’ medical thought, and further our understanding of gynaecology in the Roman empire. (shrink)

Il saggio è dedicato ad illustrare la figura di Riccardo Rufo di Cornovaglia del quale si conosce assai poco, soprattutto dal punto di vista biografico. Nella prima parte dello studio l'A., dopo aver tracciato brevemente un profilo della vita e delle opere dell'autore, passa a confutare tre posizioni storiografiche in base alle quali si afferma che 1) Rufo non era ancora maestro quando entrò nell'Ordine dei Minori 2) non avrebbe composto alcun commento alla Metafisica o ad alcuno dei libri naturales (...) di Aristotele 3) le sue lezioni su Aristotele non sarebbero state presentate a Parigi. È al secondo punto che l'A. ha dedicato più attenzione: Rufo infatti non solo sarebbe autore di un commento alla Metafisica che esercitò una notevole influenza su alcuni autori tra cui Ruggero Bacone, Roberto Grossatesta e Bonaventura da Bagnoregio. All'interno del dibattito de aeternitate Rufo fu fortemente influenzato dal Filopono: egli infatti fu il primo ad utilizzare gli argomenti contra basati sulla nozione di infinito, notoriamente ascritti a Bonaventura. Il suo intervento fu molto importante anche per quanto riguarda la dottrina dell'impetus e la discussione sui corpi celesti. (shrink)

Some names, specifically the proper names by which people are called, are considered “a mess” by at least one prominent contemporary philosopher.Although I quote from a number of Rufus’s works, there are two on which this paper is primarily based, both written when Rufus was a master of Arts in Paris, before 1238. I refer to the first as the Urmetaphysics. The second is a two-part treatise which Professor Wood has called the Contra Averroem. The Urmetaphysics is (...) class='Hi'>Rufus’s first commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics, only very recently discovered by Professor Wood. It is to be distinguished from his second Metaphysics commentary which I refer to as th e Main Metaphysics Commentary. The Contra Averroem is comprised of “De ideis” and “De causa individuationis,” of which “De ideis” deserves a special mention. Discovered by Professor Timothy Noone, it w as first transcribed by Noone and Wood in 1990. Recently, Professor Noone has kindly sent me a revised transcription, for which I am very grateful. This transcription is quoted here.With the exception of “De ideis,” all quotations from Rufus are based on transcriptions made or revised by Professor Wood. Citations will indicate the relevant folio numbers of the manuscript or manuscripts on which the transcription is based. The manuscript itself, when first referred to, will be identified by the name of the city in which the library which houses it is located, the abbreviated name of the library, and its codex number.“All in all, proper names are a mess and if it weren’t for the problem of how to get the kids to come fo r dinner, I’d be inclined to just junk them” (David Kaplan, “Dhat,” Syntax and Semantics, vol. 9, ed. Peter Cole; repr. in Contemporary Perspectives in the Philosophy of Language, ed. P. French et al. (Minneapolis : University of Minnesota Press, 1979, pp. 383–400, p. 386). Looking at the matter from the perspective of medieval philosophy, we might say that the reason such names are semantically ill-behaved is that the act of naming from which they d erive is not one of adequate naming. Moreover, supposing that all manner of beings, including people, are “things,” we might let adequate naming be governed by the following principle: an agent adequately names a thing if and only if, knowing its proper nature, she bestows a name on the thing by considering that nature. Obviously, on this principle, the acts of naming from which people in our societies derive their names are not acts of adequate naming. (shrink)

Il Commento di Rufo alla Metafisica aristotelica è tradito integralmente nel Vat. lat. 4538 e parzialmente in altri quattro mss.: Erfurt, Bibl. Amplon., Q. 290 ; Praha, Archiv Prazského Hradu, M. 80 ; Oxford, New College, 285 ; Oxford, Bodl. Libr., misc. lat. C. 71 . Per l'ed. dello Scriptum sono stati utilizzati V, E, e N. In questa sezione del Commento , dove il francescano inglese si propone di conciliare la dottrina dell'immutabilità divina con la dottrina della creazione e (...) dei futuri contingenti, l'A. individua la presenza di argomenti utilizzati da Roberto Grossatesta nel De libero arbitrio. (shrink)

Reconstroem-se, neste artigo, as objeções de Daniel Dahlstrom e Rufus Duits à crítica de Tugendhat à tese heideggeriana de que o conceito primordial de verdade consiste na noção de desvelamento. De diferentes modos, ambos os autores mantêm que Heidegger, ao contrário das acusações de Tugendhat, seria capaz de dar conta da falsidade. Grosso modo, enquanto Dahlstrom propõe que Tugendhat não apreciou o caráter transcendental do conceito originário de verdade em Heidegger, Duits acusa Tugendhat de haver se prendido à perspectiva (...) metafísica da Vorhandenheit. O objetivo deste artigo é indicar, com a ajuda dessa discussão, a questão fundamental da crítica de Tugendhat que, como parte da literatura mostrou, reside não tanto na exigência de uma explicação para a falsidade, mas muito mais na exigência de uma justificação para a transição semântica de ‘verdade’. Após mostrar nas duas primeiras seções como, respectivamente, Dahlstrom e Duits não atingem o cerne da crítica de Tugendhat, defendo na terceira seção minha interpretação da crítica de Tugendhat contra certas reservas recentemente articuladas por Wrathall. Concluo indicando a consonância dessa interpretação com a concessão de Heidegger em Das Ende der Philosophie und die Aufgabe des Denkens e apontando algumas questões pendentes. (shrink)

Say that a d.c.e. degree d is isolated by a c.e. degree b, if bMathematics Subject Classification (2000): 03D25, 03D30, 03D35 RID=""ID="" Key words or phrases: Computably enumerable (...) set – d.c.e. degree – Isolation – High/low hierarchy RID=""ID="" Ishmukhametov's research is supported by RFBR grant 01-01-00733, and Wu's research is supported by the Marsden Fund of New Zealand. Wu would like to thank his supervisor, Prof. Rod Downey, for his many helpful suggestions and comments. (shrink)

InEpistulae ex Ponto4.8, one of the last poems written from exile (dated to 15 or 16c.e.), Ovid expresses his increasing hopes for Germanicus' assistance in effecting his recall to Rome. Though ostensibly addressed to his stepdaughter's father-in-law, P. Suillius Rufus, the poem contains a petition to Germanicus (27–88), as a poet to a poet, which promises future commemoration in Ovid's poetry if he is removed from Tomis:clausaque si misero patria est, ut ponar in ullo,qui minus Ausonia distet ab Vrbe (...) loco,unde tuas possim laudes celebrare recentesmagnaque quam minima facta referre mora. (85–8)and if my country is closed against me in my misery, may I be placed in any place less distant from the Ausonian city, whence I might celebrate your praises while they are recent and relate your great deeds with the least delay. (shrink)

Philodemus of Gadara was a poet and Epicurean philosopher who, after leaving Gadara, studied in Athens under Zeno of Sidon before moving to Italy. Once in Italy, he lived in the area around the Bay of Naples, where he belonged to a circle of Epicureans that included Siro as well as the Roman poets Vergil, L. Varius Rufus, Quintilius Varus, and Plotius Tucca. His epigrams were preserved as part of the Greek Anthology, while his prose works were discovered at (...) the Villa of the Papyri in Herculaneum, carbonized by the first pyroclastic surge of Mount Vesuvius in 79 C.E. He wrote on a wide range of topics, including epistemology, ethics, theology, aesthetics, logic and science, and the history of philosophy, but not physics. In his works, he presents himself as an entirely orthodox Epicurean. He does so by explicating the teachings of earlier Epicureans (especially those of Epicurus, Metrodorus, Hermarchus, and Polyaenus), defending the positions of his teacher Zeno of Sidon, arguing against fellow Epicureans whom he perceives to have strayed from orthodoxy, and advancing Epicurean positions against other schools like the Academics, Peripatetics, Stoics, Cynics, and Cyrenaics. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:American Journal of Philology 127.1 (2006) 149-152 [Access article in PDF] Mario Erasmo. Roman Tragedy: Theatre to Theatricality. Austin: University of Texas Press, 2004. xii + 211 pp. Cloth, $45. [Erratum]This is a study of Roman tragedy from Livius Andronicus to Seneca. Erasmo states that his aim is to study the development of the form, "focusing on the process of how Roman tragedy became increasingly theatricalized and the role (...) [End Page 149] played by Roman culture in shaping the perception of theatricality on and off the stage" (x). The center of the study is, therefore, the incorporation into Roman tragedy, either in the script produced by the dramatist or in the same script as manipulated in performance, of material drawn from Roman life and political culture and, by extension, the reflection of theatrical figures and motifs in the world outside. Most interesting, therefore, is the material handled in chapters 3 and 4 (52–121), where Erasmo engages inter alia with Pompey's restaging of the Clytemnestra of Accius, with the Iter of Cornelius Balbus, and with the Thyestes of Varius Rufus. There are some provocative suggestions here which merit attention. There is also much of which this cannot fairly be said.Erasmo begins his account with the tragedies of Livius Andronicus (9–14) and moves on to Naevius (14–18), Ennius (18–28), Pacuvius (34–42), and Accius (42–51). Each author is given a brief introduction, and his place in the history of the genre is set out. Erasmo then takes one play of each of these writers and attempts to set out what can be inferred from the extant fragments that remain. It often appears that the principal criterion for selection of this sample work is simply that its remains are rather more numerous than those of any other work of the author in question. There is little guarantee that they will actually develop Erasmo's central thesis. This finally makes for one rather unsatisfactory coda after another. More effective is the deployment of the material to hand in chapters 3 and 4 (52–121), although it was probably unnecessary to print the dream narrative of the Accian Tarquin twice (62–63 and 92–93). Seneca takes center stage only in the brief chapter 5 (122–39).Erasmo notes the rather different definitions of the term "metatheatre" offered by Gentili and Slater (5). It is probably fair to say that the definition drawn from the latter ("theatre that demonstrates an awareness of its own theatricality") is rather more familiar to most modern readers. Yet Erasmo has a further claim, and this is summarized on the same page: "allusions to personalities or events outside of the theatre or to the dramatic action of the play are needed to understand the play." This is a markedly unclear piece of prose, but what Erasmo is trying to say probably emerges rather better if we delete "outside of" and read "external to." For what "metatheatre" means in Erasmo's discussion of Ennius (19 and 22) is the playwright's inclusion in his adaptation of Euripides' Iphigenia and Medea of language redolent of Roman society and custom. Now this does not directly draw attention to the modes of representation of the play at issue to the same extent as does, for example, the appearance on stage of the choragus in the Curculio, but there is little doubt that Erasmo is reaching here for something important.Some interesting work has been done of late on Pompey's rather unfortunate identification of himself with Agamemnon (see especially E. Champlin in D. Braund and C. Gill [eds.] Myth, History and Culture in Republican Rome [Exeter, 2003], 295–319; and F. R. Berno in Maia 56 [2004]). Erasmo offers his own contribution to this issue with his discussion of the staging of the Clytemnestra of Accius (83–91). Pointing to Cicero Ad Familiares 7.1.2, he treats the grand [End Page 150] spectacle of Agamemnon's entry as a reperformance of Pompey's own triple triumph six years before. Yet why put all this in the context of a drama... (shrink)

If metaphysics is centrally concerned with charting the domain of the possible, the only coherent account of the ground of metaphysical possibility and of our capacity for modal knowledge is to be found in a version of essentialism: a version that I call serious essentialism, to distinguish it from certain other views which may superficially appear very similar to it but which, in fact, differ from it fundamentally in certain crucial respects. This version of essentialism eschews any appeal whatever to (...) the notion of possible worlds in its account of the nature and ground of metaphysical possibility, for reasons that which I shall endeavour to explain and justify in this paper. (shrink)

According to some testimonies, the Aristotelian ethics have been torn between a hedonist reading, as much as an anti‑hedonist one, throughout Antiquity. From Critolaos to Verginius Rufus and Sosicrates, pleasure is considered both as “an evil [that] gives birth to many other evils” and as the first appropriate thing and the supreme good. This noteworthy disagreement stems from a famous difficulty within the Aristotelian corpus, raised by Aspasius, i.e. the alleged coexistence of two ‘definitions’ of pleasure in Aristotle’s Nicomachean (...) Ethics VII and X. In this paper, I offer a reconstruction of Alexander’s treatment of this difficulty, based on some passages from Alexander’s Ethical Problems and the Mantissa. I try to show that Alexander does not dismiss the so‑called “definition A” of pleasure as being spurious, although he obviously values more the definition B. Even if he never openly brands the definition A as “dialectic”, Alexander takes it as a reputable endoxon, which however needs to be emended in that it blurs the distinction between pleasure and activity. Pleasure only supervenes on the activity to which it is appropriate, and this supervenience is precisely what accounts for the inaccuracy of the definition A. As much as the child conflates the apparent good and the good, so the hedonist takes pleasure to be identical with the activity and the telos of human life. On the contrary, for Alexander, pleasure is actually only a sign of happiness and the shadow of the activity. (shrink)

Entre los documentos del exjesuita peruano Juan Pablo Viscardo y Guzmán que el venezolano Francisco Miranda recibió del plenipotenciario norteamericano en Inglaterra, Rufus King, se encontraba la "Carta dirigida a los españoles americanos". Este pieza documental, considerada "la primera proclama de la independencia" hispanoamericana, había sido escrita originalmente en francés hacia 1792 como testimonio de protesta de la situación de vejación y sometimiento que tenía España a sus colonias americanas, para ser presentada ante las autoridades inglesas. El entusiasmo que (...) despertó la "Carta" del fallecido jesuita en el temible e infatigable conspirador Miranda, fue inequívoca, al punto que no sólo se dispuso a traducirla y publicarla (Londres, 1801), sino la presentó, en su frustrada expedición de Coro en agosto de 1806, como portaestandarte de la cruzada libertadora. [Fragmento]. (shrink)

El propósito de este texto es ofrecer una visión general de la relación entre nación e historia en los debates que se generaron por parte de los historiadores y otros intelectuales de las ciencias sociales a finales del siglo XIX y durante gran parte del siglo XX. La reflexión central que se plantea consiste entonces en estudiar y mostrar cómo al mismo tiempo que las naciones modernas eran objeto de un proceso de redefinición política, en el escenario intelectual de las (...) ciencias sociales, y en particular de los historiadores, fueron apareciendo también un conjunto de debates y obras que intentaban problematizar y someter a consideración las relaciones que pretendían establecerse entre la nación y la historia como un elemento que las justificaba. (shrink)

Although the influence of Royce on King’s conception of the beloved community is contested, scholars readily concede that Royce’s ideas exerted, as Rufus Burrow puts it, “at least an indirect influence on King’s socioethical thought.” The African American experience altered significantly if not decisively the socioethical trajectory of this trope – namely, “the beloved community” – within the history of philosophy and theology in America. Admittedly, Royce’s philosophical speculations on “the beloved community” and “loyalty to loyalty” can sometimes seem (...) quite remote from, e.g., Thurman’s work with the Church for the Fellowship of All Peoples in San Francisco or King’s activist-advocacy work with the civil rights... (shrink)